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The ‘lives versus livelihood’ conundrum in Pakistan is emblematic of the difficulties
that accompany the balancing of conflicting rights in transitioning democracies. From
testing the ability of various tiers of the government machinery to work together to
keeping the economy afloat as the country faced lockdowns, Pakistan deeply felt
the onset of the burden of disease. The country’s journey through the pandemic was
shrouded in deep political contestations over power struggle between the provinces
and the centre. As the crisis deepened in mid-2020, the social policies for pandemic
response became the site for centralising authority; where trade-offs were made
between fundamental rights and well-being of citizens to draw political mileage and
cementing the narrative of the centre.
The effective response to the pandemic was heavily dependent on the ability of the
various tiers of the government to work smoothly together. This raised the question
of clear demarcation of responsibility and capacity of the structures to fulfil their
responsibilities.
Under the 18th Constitutional Amendment, the federal government in Pakistan
is relieved of the responsibility in many major sectors and provincial control was
reasserted over the functions and institutions of local governments. With the aim
to bring political decision-making closer to the common citizen, the move aimed
at relegation of the domains of policymaking and service delivery to the provincial
government, so that the point of contact for the social and economic affairs of the
average citizen was the province.
Constitutional bodies like the Council of Common Interests (CCI) exist to resolve
the disputes of power sharing between the federation and provinces and tackle
the negative externalities of devolving certain divisions to the provinces by linking
them both to the centre and to other provinces’ policies. As a natural step for their
effective functioning, the provinces also depend upon a fully functioning system
of local governments for service delivery providing them with real time data and
information. Despite constitutional requirements, the local government structure is
non-existent in three out of the four provinces in Pakistan (in some cases for over a
year now). The outbreak of COVID-19 highlighted and exacerbated the deep-rooted
structural, procedural, and ideological shortcomings of this system of devolution.
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Rifts Between the Centre and the Provinces – Battle
of Narratives:
The rising number of cases and deaths put immense pressure on the government to
respond – immediately. As cases started mounting towards end of February 2020,
to curb the spread of COVID-19, the country’s entire political system comprising
of federal and provincial authorities and national and provincial parliaments got
intensely busy in crafting a holistic response to the crisis. However, the Prime
Minister’s initial response to the coronavirus was indecisive and weak. A lack of
ownership of his approach by the provinces exposed the disconnect and lack of
coordination between the federal and provincial governments. For instance, the
Prime Minister initially publicly opposed the concept of lockdowns and declared it
to be an anti-poor policy propagated by the elite to insulate themselves and which
would destroy the economy. The Sindh provincial government, meanwhile, was
asserting the need for a lockdown, and eventually announced one for the province,
stating that saving lives were more important than the economy. The public debate
was, hence, reduced to a ‘lives vs. livelihoods’ standoff.
The inability of the federal government to see eye-to-eye with the opposition-ruled
province of Sindh on the direction and pace of the province’s aggressive but publicly
lauded steps to impose strict lockdown revealed the inability of the ruling parties
to move past their differences and resulted in the politicisation of public health
and safety fragmented governance. And it was not just Sindh. While PM Khan
announced that there will not be any lockdown, the Punjab government decided
to impose one, while Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan only imposed a partial
one. 
Though health is a devolved area, it has been an arena for centre-province
competition. Historically, many public health initiatives were retained as national
programmes, due to standardisation and global commitments issues. The National
Programme on Malaria, Tuberculosis (TB), and Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) and the Extended Programme of Immunization (EPI), for example,
both continue to be run from the capital. The pandemic only exasperated these
federal-provincial differences as they got played in the form of a tug-and-pull
between “rights vs livelihood” approach to deal with the crisis. 
The role of parliamentarians in involving public health experts and medical
practitioner is vital for the transparency and effectiveness of the health response
against the pandemic. As public representatives and legislators, parliamentarians
have the added responsibility of reaching out to their constituents for risk
communication and public health messages. Hence, a crucial part of effective
responsiveness to the pandemic depended upon the ability of the government
to focus on empathic and consistent messaging, to present a united front, and
to take charge of the narrative to dispel confusion. The nature and magnitude of
the coronavirus pandemic especially necessitated the fact-based, coherent, and
synchronized messaging by the government to take the public into confidence. The
U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres went as far to call this the pandemic of
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misinformation as the sheer volume of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation
online crowded out the accurate information making it hard to distinguish between
fact and fake content. Instead of taking control of the narrative, the constant rifts
between politicians being played out live on prime time television and creation of
new ad-hoc voluntary structures, left the government’s response inconsistent and
messaging muddled.
Creation of New Structures to Fill in the Delivery
Gaps
Like the rest of the world, the parliament in Pakistan was not able to perform its
functions properly and was shut down in March 2020, on account of the pandemic
and reconvened months afterwards when the federal parliament met in person to
debate the corona virus response. Though the Speaker of the National Assembly
formed a special parliamentary committee on the COVID-19 response, the
committee met only a few times and parliamentary scrutiny did not make much
headway due to the lack of consensus on the way forward.1) Being cognizant of the
shortcomings, as a part of DRI’s work on parliamentary oversight in Pakistan, DRI
closely monitored the situation and provided technical input to parliamentarians on
key policy areas of education, health, emergency cash transfers, social protection,
economic relief, and food security aiming to strengthen parliamentary committees
and secretariats, as well as supporting increased parliamentary participation to
reclaim civic space.
When the virus seemed to be spiralling out of control in June 2020, the Federal
Government had the option to utilise existing institutions for inter-provincial
coordination to reach a consensus-based response to the emergency. Instead, a
joint civilian-military body —the National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC)
— was created to coordinate the national COVID-19 response. The military’s
intelligence agencies led in surveillance and contact tracing efforts. Many high-
ranking military officers started playing an increasingly visible role and enforced
“smart” lockdowns in hundreds of COVID hotspots across the country. This body
was visualised as a “nerve centre to synergise and articulate the unified national
effort against COVID-19.”
While the NCOC tried to streamline communication from its own platform, there were
various authorities giving conflicting messages, including ministers of the federal
government, the courts, the clergy, news anchors, and so on. It did not help the
situation that the NCOC was established without Cabinet approval at a meeting of
the National Security Committee. To conceive a nationally cohesive and effective
communications strategy, the narrative must have transparency and clarity, with the
assistance and consensus of provincial governments and localised communication.
It is also pertinent to note that historically, Pakistan’s previous successful dealing
with national disasters in part was due to political stability; the authorities in question
responded to flooding, earthquakes, and dengue outbreaks by leveraging their
control over provincial administrations they had presided over for successive terms.
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Many of these measures “generally tended to rely on executive fiat rather than
concrete legislative and institutional reforms.” Hence, in the ongoing pandemic
response, as the federal government had not acquired administrative longevity, the
penchant for relying on executive fiat continuing to be the definitive trend was not
surprising.
Recognizing the limitation of the existing systems to timely deliver and have a
household level reach, the PM also formulated a coronavirus youth “Tiger Force”
that would help the government disseminate its message. At its very inception,
critics of the ruling party begun to term it as an unnecessary “parallel force” with
no legal cover, when the scope of the Tiger Force was increased to also include
price inspections, supervising utility stores, checking hoarding and helping with
tree plantations. The outsourcing of such primary functions to unelected officials
or volunteer forces is a further indication of the void left by local governments.
At the lowest rung of the federation, any number of stopgap arrangements have
been unable to serve as a substitute for a local government elected through a
consistent framework and one which can offer robust service delivery. Simply put,
the federal government does not have the capacity to manage a million volunteers
on top of dealing with a pandemic which was being referred to as the first social
media infodemic in the history of humankind.
The Absence of Local Governments
The absence of clear insights, actionable data and implementable instructions for
district administration accentuated the governance challenges faced by the country
in its pandemic response. In effect, district commissioners and the PAS machinery
under them have had near total control of managing the pandemic at the ground
level. This may represent a more efficient model to some; one where decision-
making is in the hands of a technocrat and administrator rather than, perhaps, an
unqualified public representative. However, many decades of experimentation with
such structures empirically reveal that power serves best when it is in the hands of
people it is meant to serve.
Local governments could have made a qualitative difference in the collection of
data from neighbourhood, street, and household levels for which there can be no
better source than elected representatives who are also residents of the area. Local
government officials as elected community representatives would also have enabled
policy implementation in a democratic way as imposition by force is unsustainable
and ineffective.
Coordination has smoothened over the many months since the NCOC began
operations. However, the initial discord between the centre and at least one of
its federating units sharply contrasted with its reliance on military-led executive
institutions such as the NCOC and NDMA. It also throws up important questions
regarding why disaster management authorities in Pakistan have almost exclusively
been chaired by military personnel. Up until the NDMA Chairman’s retirement in
December, he was heading both NDMA and ERRA simultaneously.
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The fiscal crunch was coupled with a tense political environment in the country
created by back and forth allegations of corruption. Since the start of the
government’s tenure, the opposition has consistently claimed that the National
Accountability Bureau (NAB) has been used as a tool for political victimisation
where political dissent is silenced by implicating opponents with false charges
and some bureaucrats associated with past administrations have been arrested.
Several commentators noted the bureaucratic inertia caused by the reluctance of
the executive branch to initiate projects for fear of undue scrutiny, especially in the
early stages of the pandemic response before NDMA was designated as point of
procurement. This was despite the relaxation of public procurement rules in case
of emergencies. However, in Sindh, the ruling party’s representatives accused the
provincial government of corruption in pandemic spending, demanding an audit and
threatening legal action.
These routine political standoffs acquired a particular urgency in the pandemic
response. Instead of providing leadership during a frightening emergency, political
polarisation escalated during the pandemic. These rifts become prominent in every
major area of service delivery.
Conclusion
An effective pandemic response strategy had to be nuanced, data-driven,
transparent,
robust and public health-led, demanding close scrutiny by public representatives
to ensure equitable access to the system by all vulnerable groups. Rather than
recognizing the need for a more collaborative consensus-based approach to
governing, the pandemic response was driven more by the battle of narratives. The
Prime Minister stated in June that the 18th Amendment had to be “reviewed,” and
commented that the fiscal transfers from the federation to the provinces were driving
the Federal Government’s deficit.
At the beginning stages, when the coronavirus response fell to the provincial
governments, there was a glimmer of hope that the crisis might actually help
smoothen out the political fault lines and enable democratic consolidation in
Pakistan. This did not happen. The pandemic opened the pandoras box of largely
unconstructive and inconclusive debate on problems with provincial autonomy
and the 18th Constitutional Amendment that granted it — with those critical of the
law pushing back against the initial provincial control of the virus response. These
skirmishes between the various tiers of government, narratives, and political fault
lines, diluted the ability of the government to effectively deal with the crisis and
resulted in the trade-offs between fundamental rights and well-being of citizens.
A coordinated response requires building a political consensus. Unilateral approach
to a pandemic policy is impossible in a federation with a multi-party-political system,
as the likelihood that one political party will monopolize political authority at all
tiers of government is narrow. Pakistan’s example shows, that attempts to override
- 5 -
and undermine federating units during national crisis leads to policy inertia, poor
messaging, and inconsistent enforcement.
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